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Abstract 
The dilemma of regulation or deregulation in the financial and banking system is a challenge considering the financial 
market convulsions in the last 5 years. For this, using the comparative analysis I sought to observe the advantages and 
disadvantages of each variant. The vast literature on the subject matter was a considerable help for me, the study of the 
great economists (both theorists and practitioners) like Keynes, Smith, Krugman, Soros, Llewellyn, Hayek, Greenspan, 
Asser, Mises, Roubini ruling in favor of one or the other variants. Because it is a matter of present interest, the regulation 
problem came not only to my attention, but the crisis pushed the authorities of the developed countries to react and seek to 
apply drastic measures to regulate the financial market. I concluded that the benefits of regulatory standards are recognized 
by countries that do not make it a priority. Financial stability is called by economists a global public good, so all countries 
benefit from it, whether or not they contribute to it. These interdependencies are strong incentives for bank regulators 
mechanisms that they ensure the adherence of all countries to a set of common standards. 
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1. Introduction 
The devastating effects of the current financial crisis opened a controversial topic in economic theory. 
Which is the best option for a stable economy: a regulated economy or a deregulated one? The activity of 
supervision and regulation has always been an essential element in the process of building a stable system. The 
regulation requires supervision and control from the authorities over the work of private companies with the 
objectives of safety and reliability. Governments interfere in the activities of the market economy to ensure that 
the markets operate efficiently or to change products activities to achieve social goals.  
2. Regulation or deregulation on the international financial markets 
Regulations are defined as attempts to correct market failure. When we speak of market failure we 
consider for example monopoly power. Market distortions through the exercise of monopoly power may limit 
the provision of quality services, unreasonably increase prices or restrict innovation. The regulations seek to 
shade down the effects and external costs which may affect the market in a directly or indirectly manner. 
In the last decades, the regulations had assumed that markets are essentially rational and highly efficient 
in allocating resources and that markets are self-regulating and correcting. The intervention by regulation is 
justified by the need to correct rare failures. The first justification for regulating financial institutions and 
markets is the asymmetry of information. This is frecquently encountered on the product market. Many 
products are complex, difficult to understand and compare or involve a substantial investment. A second 
justification is that, by their nature, the financial contracts involve the engagement to make future payments at a 
predetermined time in amounts and under specified conditions. The more sophisticated the economy gets, the 
more it depends on the financial contracts and is predisposed to set-back to meet its financial obligations.  The 
indispensable role of finances in a modern economic system and also the risk of financial failure to lead to a 
systemic instability is a general external effect that may require significant costs, both in economic product and 
the government revenues. 
The second justification is determined by the risk of the system. Instability has many definitions, but 
generally it occurs when an institution's financial difficulties are conveyed to other institutions. This 
shortcoming is the fact that contagious issues of an institution triggers a state of disbelief for the customer to 
other institutions. In other cases, the failure of an institution to meet its obligations may cause the failure of 
others, initially stable. Traditionally, banks, ie the institutions that receive deposits were only considered 
vulnerable in this purport. Banks vulnerability to a financial crisis is due to the precarious nature of the 
financial services offered, which transforms the un-liquid capital in liquid liabilities. A bank’s commitments 
can be met under normal circumstances because the customers demand access to their deposits can be 
predictable, and the bank has the necessary liquidity. However, when a sufficiently large number of depositors 
simultaneously request access to their own money, the bank cannot meet its commitments without outside 
assistance. For all banks have this vulnerability and depositors cannot distinguish between a safe bank and an 
unsafe one, the distrust in one of them can spread to others. Also, the first sign of mistrust, with or without 
cause, of a bank’s solvency may even cause insolvency if the bank's assets must be reduced or even eliminated 
quickly to respond to requests for the withdrawal of deposits. 
The problem of systemic risk dominates the international regulations. These regulations aim to controll 
external costs. External effects which are affecting the national banking system due to another may occur 
directly or indirectly. Directly, if a bank makes significant operations abroad. If it has solvency problems, all 
the subsidiaries are affected. Therefore, governing organisms are required to determine exactly which of them 
is responsible so that these types of banks should be always under effective supervision. Effective international 
regulations require that all countries apply the same standards of prudency, so that a bank in a certain state isn’t 
less regulated than the one in other state. A bank operating in a state with a relaxed system can affect in a 
negative matter other countries through international operations. Moreover, a less regulated bank makes unfair 
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competition to others. 
The increased instability of financial markets are contributing to the innovation capacity of financial and 
banking institutions. Reduction of consumer appetite for traditional products, poor capitalization of financial 
institutions and insolvency issues arising from developing countries are other causes of boosting innovation in 
the financial sector. Technological progress has a direct effect on innovation by lowering transaction costs, 
rapid dissemination of information of financial nature, emphasizing the integration of markets. Linked to 
technological progress is the sophistication of financial product or service innovation. The more complex it 
gets, the harder it will be absorbed by the market and will require also a substantial initial investments by the 
supplier. Not all customers of the financial institutions have a solid knowledge base to enable them to easily 
understand the sometimes complex mechanisms of financial products. Therefore, all that is complex is difficult 
to accept, too. In the case of the financial innovations with a high degree of complexity, deployment solutions 
can be serious investments in promoting and explaining the use and characteristics of the product or its 
adjustment to the level of understanding of the specific customer profile of the financial entity. 
With the help of new technologies, the barriers between markets have been eliminated, bringing the 
banking activities, the insurance and the capital markets in an open market, much wider and with a higher 
absorption capacity, the financial market. Innovations arising not only assumed new products and services 
(radical innovations), but were associated amendments to existing technologies (incremental innovations) 
precisely to better adapt them to a more aggressive market with longing desire for expansion and a well-defined 
goal: profit. If we look at the three categories previously mentioned markets we will realize that radical 
innovations concern mostly capital markets and the incremental banking market and insurance market. 
The regulations weaknesses encouraged innovation to avoid certain requirements. For example, under 
Basel I, it was encouraged the phenomenon of securing assets in order to minimize the mandatory capital. 
Failure to counter the risks of ghost companies and SIV 's, despite the large exposure of the banks to them, led 
to the creation of a shadow banking system. The associated risks have been at the border, not being included in 
the balance sheet, but no really excluded. Financial engineering, very active before the crisis, can be described 
as a way to speculate regulations. Some observers have blamed the type of accounting 'mark -to market' 
(settlement day), which would have exacerbated the vulnerability of the downward spiral in asset prices. The 
growing importance of assessments in the Basel II made the system to become more fragile because assets 
were assessed much more favorable, and these assessments tended to reflect the present state rather than meet a 
predictive role. Other experts spoke about the institutional flaws. The separation between the supervisor and the 
central bank in some major countries meant that there was no official institution responsible for financial 
stability and didn’t have all relevant information to rapidly support an institution in crisis. 
There were gaps in regulations. Some institutions actively present in securing market were too loosely 
regulated than other major financial institutions. More important than anything, perhaps, was the failure of 
ideology. Supervisory Special Committee appointed by the American Congress in order to analyze the situation 
of the financial market crisis had concluded: structural and organizational issues are undoubtedly important.... 
but basically the problem that led, in terms of regulation, to the financial crisis was one of philosophy and not 
of structure. In too many instances, the tools were there, but have not been used. And where the tools lacked, 
the regulator organisms did not asked the authority to create them (U.S. Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009). 
A great supporter of the financial innovation development (particularly of the receivable derivatives) was 
Alan Greenspan (former Chairman of the Federal Reserve System), a libertarian, which has taken an 
overcrowding position in his long period of leading one of the “heavy” financial fora in the world. He was one 
of the most fervent “lawyers” of the derivative contracts considering that they have a very important role in the 
efficient functioning of the global trading system. As eloquently he expressed “hedge funds and off-stock 
exchange funds appear to represent future finances” ( A. Greenspan , 2007). Greenspan believes that the 
regulation of these innovations would not only be expensive but would inhibit the enthusiasm shown by "niche 
profits". In his view, the risks associated with derivatives are already covered by private segments (regulation 
function) and are not justified as an increase in the regulatory framework by introducing institutional 
regulations. From his point of view, any model (of risk or econometric) can not adequately capture the 
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complexity of the real systems, this failure is especially true in times of exit from a system of variables that 
describe the evolution of the system to another (the effect of his ideas was that the U.S. has adopted a law that 
derivatives were exempt from state oversight body).  
It is natural that innovation benefits those who initiate it. The problem is completely different. Is the 
market able (assaulted by all these technologies and financial innovations), to maintain its financial stability 
and avoid crisis only through its mechanisms? No. The reality of recent years has demonstrated unequivocally 
that a free market, beginning to be deregulated from the '80s failed to restrain the slippage of the financial 
institutions that run such products and services. 
In the process of reforming the financial regulations, it should be considered the optimal degree of 
diversity of the financial industry, in terms of maintaining financial stability. A balance must be found between 
competition and financial market homogenization and standardization of the rules of this market. End users are 
most affected by the lack of supervision by higher product costs, through changes in gait of contractual 
conditions (from the variability of the conditions of the contract depending on the market, some indicators can 
be handled successfully in the interests of sellers of products and financial services), the lack of complete 
information about financial instruments. Financial supervision should be adjusted at any time based on new 
products and innovations entering the market. Governments should encourage innovation, but they also have a 
responsibility to create the institutional conditions of the development for tools that can effectively monitor 
innovations. 
It also required the increased transparency of the institutions pursuing developments of innovative 
products by increasing media exposure on these products. A strong emphasis should be placed on explaining 
considering the characteristics of each product entrant with its risks. 
3. Conclusions 
To avoid this instability , the authorities should provide a safety system (safety net) that can avoid as much 
as possible the moral hazard that may occur as a result of the imposed safety net. Under the new conditions, 
market rationality (characteristic of the theory of efficient markets) has no coverage in practice. Not only that 
markets do not behave rationally, but furthermore individual rationality does not guarantee the collective one. 
There is an error in composition that implies the truth which characterizes every member of the group,  
characterizes the group in its entirety. Such a mistake made the financial institutions which assumed in their 
liquidity management, that they will be able to sell their instruments in a market that everyone tries the same 
thing. Both financial institutions and supervisor authorities oversighted that the market which behaves normally 
when a pawn wants to sell, it will not show the same behavior when all the pawns want to do the same. 
Another effect that can be eliminated by regulation is the contagion. The traditional way to prevent 
contagion in the banking system is to preserve an institution that can lend cash to other banks. As long as the 
banks can get funds to cover a massive and sudden withdrawal, a cascade effect is likely to be stopped at the 
beginning. The central bank aims to give banks the funds to cover the withdrawal of funds and thus it acts as 
the ultimate creditor. ”The central bank is called the last lender that has the capacity to borrow ... when no other 
lender cannot or will not provide sufficient funds to prevent or halt a financial panic” (Meltzer, 1986). Private 
lenders will not or cannot always give a loan. Market participants are reluctant to take risks in difficult times 
and do not want to lend at any price. Massive and simultaneous withdrawals from several banks or a period of 
major instability in the system can cause freezing of the interbank market. Sometimes, the entire system, not 
just individual banks may face a liquidity crisis. As Fred Hirsch said in his comments regarding the last creditor 
"commercial institutions which function as a banker's bank before the advent of proper function of the central 
bank ... preferred to avoid the risks that were even in greater need to be covered and to withdraw completely 
from the system before an impending crisis involving a typical uncertainty of commercially impermissible" 
(Hirsch, 1977). 
One of the measures of the most importance taken lately is that the regulatory reform of the financial 
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system known under the name of Basel III. This reform has by S. Walter the following reasons: the frequency 
of the banking crisis (from 1985 were over 30 banking crisis in the member states the Basel Committee; the 
negative effects of the banking crisis; the benefits outweight the costs of implementation (S. Walter, 2011). 
The new standards are different from the previous ones (Basel I and Basel II) in that they have a much 
wider area of coverage, and the measures promoted are both micro and macro-prudential. The standards in the 
field of microprudential concerns (Report, BNR, 2011): improving the quality of the capital base by increasing 
the minimum equity requirement; introduction of high demands to hedge (with a focus on trading book 
exposures, counterparty risk, securization exposures and secured positions); limiting the leverage effect; the 
introduction of international standards of liquidity (through financing long-term assets, at least a minimum 
amount of stable liabilities). 
As regards the macroprudential standards, they aim to create a countercyclical capital buffer to protect the 
financial system, a fixed damper for capital conservation with the purpose of covering losses, and the 
introduction of a leverage effect with benefits for the whole system. A noteworthy and appreciated thing from 
our point of view is that through Basel III, the national authorities decisions regarding the measures to maintain 
financial stability at the national level will be respected. 
Presently, a very high attention is found on technological innovations in the financial sector. This asks for a 
strong regulatory and supervisory framework. We include in this framework the increased access to 
information on derivative rigor in the authorization, organization and prudential requirements in this sector, 
reporting standards. Exceptionally, individuals may be prohibited the entry in CDS trading. Increasing the 
transparency in this market considered opaque before the crisis, the minimum standards of consumer protection 
are actual reports of other proposals made in the European Union. Unfortunately, due to disagreements between 
regulators, politicians and stakeholders, some of the proposals are only at the stage of negotiation. There is no 
guarantee that all these structural reforms would eliminate the risk, but the protection of taxpayers should 
become a reality for every state in the future. Precisely for this reason , the importance of diplomatic activity 
increases during this period, diplomacy is the one that should eliminate these differences and disparities and 
contribute to success in stabilizing the financial markets and uniform the means of protection and surveillance. 
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